1. Lessig says that he is against piracy but supports sharing. He claims that amateurs should be encouraged to fiddle with original work and create their own versions of it. He advocates creativity and fair use of original work. The basis for this seems to be economics. As long as the person altering the work isn’t making a profit then it is fair use. This then becomes problematic. Lessig also in the same book seems to be praising Google and other big media conglomerates for being able to use free use to their advantage. So then how is that different from piracy? If sharing entails a community and being able to access creativity for free and the greater good. Then how when it is abused by a media conglomerate is it still okay? With this argument, then video piracy is also advantageous to the original media workers as it promotes their songs/movies possibly to places that would have otherwise never had access to it. So it is a win-win. If big companies such as Google, Facebook et all can do it why can’t a pirate?
2. If Lessig’s argument is that it is okay for Google to do it because they came up with the innovations through which to make people volunteering information be profitable. Then would it not also be okay to praise the innovations of p2p file sharing? If p2p was able to come up with a way where a little information shared under fair use could be complied by a machine to create the whole, then how can you persecute each person for being willing to share that little bit. If a bunch of my friends gave me a piece of the puzzle and I created the whole.. would that make me a pirate?
3. Also if the point of sharing is just for inspiration and creativity. Then wouldn’t RO culture also permit that? If a person watched a Madonna vidoe and was inspired by her to create similar music is that not creativity? Why is there a need to be able to take her music and chop it up and claim it as their own? Or is RW technology best for the purposes of satire, humor and fandom? Or then alternately if someone made a mash-up and profited from that is that wrong?

Lessig seems to promote free culture but at the same time complicates it. He does not draw lines but rather seems to be saying it is a continuous process. If that is the case then a criminal today may not be one tomorrow. I do hope we can get more into the nuances of why big media companies using free software, information, videos by fans is  considered technical innovation but the use of it by others is considered piracy. Should it then be that any venture that makes a profit should pay? Would that be a better solution. Use if but if you make money then share the wealth too.

2.) In the fourth chapter of the book, Lessig describes the potential for a contemporary revival of RW culture. In doing so, he focuses primarily on two types of remix literacy: (1) text (e.g. writing) and (2) media (e.g. pictures, music, and videos – or what people in industry call “rich-media”). In this discussion, he draws on a number of interesting points – most revolving around the relation between these two forms of creation. He describes how, in writing, it is standard practice to borrow and quote from others, so long as we cite/attribute the original – and this is commonly accepted, without permission. However, in the other media forms described above, this is not the case. I feel this is a compelling point, and one I had not previously considered. This portion of the book urges us to ask a complicated question (on page 54): Why does writing have so many more freedoms than other creative properties? In general, Lessig seems to argue that this is largely due to our conception of writing as the ultimate (or at least most culturally engrained) form of democratic creativity – as it is a form that virtually anyone has access to. His argument, then, shifts towards the increasing access digital technologies offer ordinary people to “write” (for an audience) with images, music, and videos – and how the law has failed in granting this new level of access the freedoms it deserves. Thus, I pose a few more questions to build on Lessig’s: Why do you suppose we hold creative forms of text and “rich-media” to different legal standards? Why do we culturally view these practices on such different planes? What economical, political, cultural, and/or social forces influence our perspective here? And finally, does it seem realistic that some day we will treat and perceive “rich-media” as we do text, on a similarly democratic plane?

The middle of the book reads like a celebration of star internet sites; that’s all fine, but I was curious about his description of the hybrid economy, which will either supplant the traditional commercial and sharing sorts or run alongside them. These are the wave of the future, but what will they yield? Indeed, some seem worse than others, and I’m thinking here of the Microsoft example. The first couple were fine (craigslist, Flickr), but the collaboration space Microsoft is cultivating seemed really, and unashamedly, exploitative (200). Did anyone else get that impression? 

The ending about why kids suffer and why the wealthy corporations/campaign donors win out seemed shoehorned in. This could have been, and should be, another book on its own. But anyway, Lessig seems to be critical of both the law as it stands today, and also what’s happening to society vis-a-vis the youth’s proclivity to download illegal music. We perceive the kids as criminals, and they apparently internalize that. Which do you think Lessig takes issue with more? The law or the culture? And do you think his position is sensible?

Another thing that might be useful: how could you compare and contrast Lessig and Jenkins? I know that each quoted the other in their respective works, and Lessig even invoked Jenkins’ classic convergence culture tropes: Star Wars and the Lawver/Warner “Potter War.” I can think of some differences: Lessig doesn’t seem to be as much of an industry consultant/insider who mediates and negotiates between the fans and the media giants. His concern is more for the superfluous attributes of copyright law. Lessig is more actively appealing to the government for change. Both are predicting the future a little bit and remain unsure of how new developments will pan out: Lessig with hybrid economies and Jenkins with convergence.

For me, reading this book is a mesmerizing voyage, during which the mysteries of new media ambiance in the economic, technological, industrial, social, and cultural contexts have been unveiled.

Jenkins’ definition of “convergence” is much more complex and far beyond the unsophisticated understanding of the intersection of media technologies. As Jenkins proclaims, convergence culture, for him, is where new media and old ones collide, grassroots and corporate media intersect, media producers and consumers interact in unpredictable ways (2). In his definition, convergence is happening more on a macro level. The convergent tendency of media has invited a large range of participation and interaction to modern media creation and distribution. Convergence culture represents a shift in the citizen’s relationship to media. Jenkins uses this definition to challenge the old idea of convergence, and calls it “the black box fallacy” (14). Why do you think “the black box theory” is a fallacy?

In some parts of this book (or maybe, one could say throughout this book), Jenkins seems to praise convergence—the discourse of blurring boundaries, disciplines, and the roles of participants in media communication—as a way to improve society and the market. Is this an optimistic point of view? Or say, does Convergence Culture merely present an ultimate utopian stance? Is Jenkins’ enthusiasm for grassroots culture (especially the influence of his fan experience on his opinions toward fan culture) making this book as a whole valueless for media criticism?

Do you think some of the fan activities depicted in this book are, as some critics put it, vaguely pathetic, unhealthy, and reflecting all the worst aspects of human nature? As possessing tremendously interests in the fandom area, I feel a bit furious when hearing people talking about fan culture sarcastically. Topics in this book, like the bottom-up power to turn over co-optation, the media literacy, the knowledge community and collective intelligence to gather, circulate, and challenge information, are staggeringly remarkable for further legitimizing fandom to a “formal” culture and “real” academic area. (I believe, Jenkins’ previous publications already did so.)

Personally speaking, I don’t think Jenkins only holds optimistic opinions. In this book, he does mention the weakness of collective intelligence is disorderly, undisciplined, and unruly (53). However, as he argues, it is also the strength of collective intelligence. The participatory paradigm, as Jenkins describes, seems providing a double-win or even a triple-win possibility for media producer, consumers, and the entertainment industry. On the other hand, he also points out that the uncontrolled fluidity of media content in this paradigm sometimes acts as a double-edged sword.

Admittedly, he does not focus on any further in-depth discussion of the negative side of the circulation of information and these participatory activities in this new media system, like the high chance of offering fragmented culture, or the so-called “divergent” trends as Grusin contends. I think, here, Jenkins is attempting to argue against some blatant pessimistic ideas by presenting the positive aspect of the increased participation in popular culture (247-249). He does believe that there would be uncertainty upon the roles media corporations, media producers, and consumers could play in this dynamic. And like he explains, divergence and convergence act as two sides of the same phenomenon (10).

This book, at the very least, successfully makes a significant point: to make our criticism more applicable to today’s media culture, we have to understand clearly what happens during the negotiation and participation in the age of media convergence. I would totally agree if someone calls Jenkins’ standpoint is critical utopianism (247).

Jenkins sees convergence culture and participatory culture as a revolution of a new means of strengthening personal bonds, collective intelligence, and a democratic voice.  He mentions these things in his first chapter with the Survivor spoiler groups (29) and throughout the book to his conclusion that references Al Gore’s news network Current.  Jenkins views participatory culture as a potential ground for intellectual growth.  Individual ideas bounce around in the bubble of message boards, fan fiction sites etc. and create a collective intelligence that enhances the minds of the individuals. In the conclusion, Jenkins admits there are commercial interests involved in convergence culture that could undermine its endless potential.  He suggests, “We are in a critical moment of transition” (243).  More than just economics are at play here though.  Can’t these message boards and fan fiction sites be used to tear people apart?  Who is to say hate groups won’t infiltrate the minds of children by creating their own Harry Potter fan fiction sites to subtly proliferate their agendas? Perhaps this sounds like moral panic, but the truth likely lies somewhere between Jenkins’ view and the moral panic view.  What do you think are the pros and cons of the different types of participatory cultures Jenkins writes about in Convergence Culture?

However, Bolter and Grusin’s chapter on video games feels dated at times. Video games have not stuck with remediating film and television as much as they suggest (certain video game genres still do remediate film with cut scenes and static cameras). Many game industry professionals (like Irrational Games’ Ken Levine) show how video games are finding its uniqueness in interactivity and less about remediating past media (Bioshock, Half-Life, Shadow of the Colossus). Are video games going against what Bolter and Grusin say? Will video games continue to both remediate and innovate? Are video games innovating to “improve” upon old media and convince customers games are better? Is it all economic?

I wish Bolter and Grusin would have spent less time during the video game section discussing pornography. I was incredibly excited to see him mention The Last Express, though. Visually wonderful experience that is worth looking at.

Bolter and Brusin have a wonderful phrase in chapter 3. ”To condemn new media is to condemn contemporary culture itself.”

I’ve got to go back and try and figure out more of the book now.

Bolter and Grusin separate technology from the social and political sphere as if it was an entirely autonomous entity that can influence, but not be influenced back. The book’s deterministic view of media does not answer the question how the changes in society modify or disrupt the progress of media. Assuming Bolter and Grusin are correct in their understanding of media, why different cultures use, perceive and value the same technology in different ways?

2) In chapter 7 Bolter and Grusin write that the introduction of new media immediately challenges the separation of high and low culture as the new technology makes high culture accessible for larger number of people. The new media claims it is at least equal (if not superior) to the existing one and, thus, should be seen as legitimate. The distinction is eventually restored by separation on the level of style – into high styles and popular styles. Does this separation of styles has something to do with the different ways immediacy, transparency and reality can be expressed and perceived?

Bolter and Grusin do not talk much about how the high styles of one art remediate the high styles of another, and how the popular styles of one art remediate the popular styles of another. Is the new version of the style sharing the same characteristic as the old one even though the technology might be different?

1) When explaining the concept of “legitimate” television in the conference paper, Newman concentrates on how viewers (and which viewers) define a show as “legitimate.” He speaks of how “legitimate” television is accessed (through the DVR, the TiVo, the DVD, on demand, downloads) underlining the ability of its audience to break the established broadcasting practices and skip ads. Newman explains that “good TV is routinely described as ‘cinematic” and that the difference in genres and production technologies is often what distinguishes it from “ordinary” television.

What in the content of a show makes it “legitimate”? Can we learn more about the workings of the society from the HBO dramas and House than from guess-the-price type of shows? If this is not the case, what makes the former “legitimate” and the latter “ordinary”?

2) Chapter 2 begins with an overview of the criticism directed against the mass culture of television. Critics accuse television of being directed to “the most vulnerable and manipulative members of society,” to those that “do not fit the model of sophisticated taste,” and to people of “lesser faculties.” These statements assume that the critics of television (and those who value “quality” programming and culture, as opposed to pop shows and culture) consider themselves to belong to a higher class or are in some way different and better than the “uneducated masses.”

We can look at this criticism as an attempt by the critics to define their own identities. The definition of identity itself, the distinct characteristics of an individual, suggests that identities are created by finding the differences between people. Thus, the debate of what is “quality” television maybe has less to do with television and more to do with a crisis of identity in society. If we assume this is the case, how television contributed to this crisis?

In chapter 5, in evaluating virtual reality, Boddy mentions that many “VR boosters” admitted it was “more compelling to talk about what VR might someday become than to describe the current impoverished devices” (68). This brought to mind the various utopian visions we have looked at throughout the semester and specifically made me think of the 3D TV ads that Sam posted last week. These ads suggested world-altering shifts in our television experience not unlike the talk surrounding VR. They also seemed focused on some kind of physical interactivity, featuring people reaching out to touch things and ordering dinosaurs back into their televisions.

Do these 3D television ads suggest a desire for physical interactivity in television, or are they utopian ideals used to sell 3D TV but not actually expected or desired? VR was appealing to think about, but it did not take off.

Boddy notes the “merging of computer and TV,” (131) and the modes of interaction with each, in the rise of the DVR. He also points out that control over programming provided by DVR shifts television from an invasive threat to a “valued domestic resource” (129). What does this say about the shifting boundaries that Boddy mentions in his introduction? How does the level of perceived user agency and mode of interaction affect how we view certain media forms?

For your viewing pleasure, the crazy Marines ad that Boddy references:

Check it: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AYQvUHVyypE